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1. INTRODUCTION 
Housing transfer taxes may influence the housing market in various ways. The most direct 
effects are related to transaction volume and prices. In countries where most households 
own their housing, these effects are also closely linked to household mobility. Effects on 
mobility have in turn implications both on the allocation of housing to households as well as 
on the allocation of jobs to employees. Ultimately, all these will influence household welfare, 
and housing transfer taxes are typically considered as a very inefficient form of taxation (e.g. 
Mirrlees et al. 2011).  
This study provides empirical evidence on the effects of the transfer tax on housing transac-
tions and household mobility in Finland using a tax reform implemented in March 2013 as a 
plausibly exogenous source of variation. The reform raised the effective transfer tax rate by 
roughly 0.5 percentage points for housing co-operatives (henceforth co-ops), but did not 
affect directly owned single-family houses. As a result, the reform created a quasi-
experimental setting which allows reliable estimation of the effects of the transfer tax using a 
differences-in-differences design where the treatment group consists of homeowners living 
in housing units subject to the tax increase and the control group of homeowners who were 
unaffected by the reform (see e.g. Best and Kleven, 2018; Besley et al., 2014; and Dachis et 
al., 2012 for similar approaches). 
In the analysis, we use transaction data with detailed information about the characteristics of 
the housing units being traded as well as registry data covering the total population of Fin-
land. Therefore we are able to analyze both housing transactions and household mobility. 
This enables us to obtain a more complete picture of the effects of housing transfer taxes 
than in the previous literature. Furthermore, as the micro data contain a lot of information 
about the characteristics of the households, we are able to examine the heterogeneity of the 
effects and, in particular, to separate between housing-related and labor market-related 
moves.  
We find that the tax reform was anticipated in the housing market. Some transactions that 
would have taken place after the reform were brought forward to late 2012 and early 2013 
so as to avoid the tax increase. The anticipation effects were especially pronounced for new 
construction and for resales with relatively large co-op loans. We also find that the tax in-
crease on co-ops also had a negative effect on the transaction volume of housing units in 
co-ops in the longer run, and may also have influenced transactions of single-family houses. 
In general, our results on transaction volume are consistent with most previous results using 
similar research designs (Dachis et al. 2012; Besley et al. 2014; Kopczuk and Munroe, 
2015; and Best and Kleven, 2018). 
Our findings also suggest that the transfer tax has a significant impact on mobility, both with-
in and across labor markets. The latter result is novel in the literature and contrasts with 
previous findings, suggesting that transfer taxes only hinder short distance and housing 
related moves (Hilber and Lyytikäinen, 2017). Our results imply that the tax creates sizable 
welfare losses due to increased mismatch of housing units and households and of workers 
and jobs.  
The report is organized as follows. In the next section, we present and discuss the previous 
literature on housing transfer taxes. After that we describe the Finnish transfer tax and the 
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reform that we exploit in the analysis. In section 4, we present evidence on the events in the 
housing market around the implementation of the reform. We mainly focus on transaction 
volume, but also discuss housing prices, co-op loans and sale times. In section 5, we pre-
sent the data, the research design and the results related to household mobility. Section 6 
presents some back-of-the-envelope welfare calculations and section 7 offers some discus-
sion and conclusion.  
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The key challenge for empirical studies aiming to identify the effects of transfer taxes is cre-
ated by the absence of exogenous variation in tax rates. In most countries, tax rates rarely 
change over time. In addition, when tax rates are changed, the changes often happen at a 
national level so that all transactions and households are affected by the reform in the same 
way. In these cases, the lack of a plausible counterfactual makes evaluation of the reform 
very difficult. However, in some cases, transfer tax reforms have been implemented in such 
a way that they create exogenous variation in the tax treatment of different households. 
These types of reforms have been exploited in some previous studies.  
Another strategy used by researchers is based on different types of discontinuities in tax 
schedules. These discontinuities may create plausibly exogenous variation in tax rates and 
thereby enable researchers to isolate the effects of transfer taxes from other factors influ-
encing housing market outcomes.   
In this section, we first review empirical literature on transfer taxes exploiting tax reforms 
and discontinuities in tax schedules as a source of identifying variation. We also discuss 
different approaches to studying the welfare effects of transfer taxes. Finally, we briefly dis-
cuss empirical results related to the effects of capital gains taxation, which has similar fea-
tures to transfer taxes.  
Best and Kleven (2018) study the UK Stamp Duty Land Tax (SDLT) using administrative tax 
data covering the universe of SDLT returns between November 2004 and October 2012. 
The data contain rich tax return information for each transaction. The authors exploit dis-
crete jumps in tax liability at certain cutoff transaction prices. For instance, the tax rate 
jumps from 0 to 1% at a price of £125,000 and from 1% to 3% at a price of £250,000. The 
results indicate that transaction taxes are highly distortionary, causing large responses in 
the price, volume and timing of transactions.  
Best and Kleven also study the effects of a temporary tax cut in 2008–2009 which abolished 
the SDLT for transactions in the £125,000–£175,000 price range without changing the tax in 
the other price categories. This feature of the reform allows its effects to be assessed using 
a difference-in-differences strategy.  
The reform was largely unanticipated and was designed to be temporary. Therefore it poten-
tially affected transaction volume in two ways. First, some households who would have 
traded a house sometime after the stamp duty holiday might have brought the transaction 
forward in order to benefit from the tax reduction. Second, some households who would not 
have traded in the absence of the tax holiday might have decided to trade because of the 
tax reduction.  
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Best and Kleven (2018) estimate the tax holiday to have increased the monthly transaction 
volume by 17%. Some 42% of this additional activity is attributed to a timing response by 
households bringing their transactions forward while the remaining 58% was estimated to be 
additional transactions compared to the status quo. The authors interpret these results using 
a theoretical model where household leverage amplifies the effects of transaction taxes on 
the transaction volume. The idea is that even small changes in the transaction tax may have 
a large impact on a household’s decision to participate in the housing market if the house-
hold is close to being constrained by a formal down-payment requirement (i.e. has relatively 
little own savings).  
Besley et al. (2014) exploit the same 2008–2009 stamp duty holiday to estimate the price 
and transaction volume effects, but using data from the UK financial regulator. The data 
include information on an independent surveyor’s valuation of the property. This allows the 
authors to use independent house valuations (instead of the actual transaction prices) when 
dividing the transactions into treatment and control groups. According to the results, the 
stamp duty holiday increased transactions by about 8%. The average reduction in the after-
tax transaction price was about £900, while the average tax reduction was about £1500. 
The price effect is not easy to interpret because additional transactions induced by the tax 
holiday may differ from other transactions in a systematic way. Using a simple bargaining 
model, the authors are able to divide the estimated price effect into a change in surplus 
sharing caused by the holiday and into a selection effect due to additional transactions tak-
ing place during the holiday period. Together with the empirical estimates of the transaction 
volume and prices, the authors conclude that roughly 60% of the increased surplus from 
trade went to the buyer. They also estimate the shadow cost of public funds to be between 
1.02 and 1.15.  
When interpreting the results related to the tax holiday, the following note is in order: If the 
stamp duty holiday increased the transaction volume over the price range directly affected 
by the tax reduction, it is also likely to have influenced transactions outside, but in close 
proximity to the price range. This is because units just below and above the price thresholds 
that determine the tax rate are likely to be close substitutes. Therefore, one would expect 
the control group to be indirectly affected by the reform. It is difficult to evaluate whether this 
is a serious concern, but if so, the effects on the transaction volume might be at least to 
some degree overestimated. Furthermore, the temporary nature of the tax change makes it 
very difficult to evaluate the long-run effects on transactions and mobility. 
Hilber and Lyytikäinen (2017) study the effects of the UK SDLT exploiting a discontinuity in 
the tax schedule where the tax rate jumps from 1% to 3%. Unlike the two studies discussed 
above, they explicitly focus on household mobility using British Household Panel Survey 
(BHPS) data. The data contain homeowners’ own assessment of the value of their house 
and information on whether the household moved the following year as well as a rich set of 
household characteristics. As the data also include information on the reason for moving 
(e.g. employment or housing reasons) and the distance of the move, different types of 
moves can be studied separately. The authors find that a higher SDLT has a strong nega-
tive impact on short distance, housing-related moves, but does not adversely affect job-
induced or long-distance mobility. The tax increase from 1% to 3% reduces household mo-
bility by 2.6 percentage points, implying a reduction in mobility of about 37%. With additional 
assumptions on the value of foregone transactions, this implies a welfare loss of roughly 
80% of additional revenue raised. 
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In the US, housing transfer taxes vary by state and in some states the tax rates change 
discontinuously, creating discontinuities in total tax liability. Kopczuk and Munroe (2015) 
utilize the discontinuity in tax liability induced by the so-called mansion tax applied in the 
states of New York and New Jersey. The tax rate is 1% on residential transactions of $1 
million or more, while transactions at prices less than $1 million are not subject to the tax. 
Therefore, in both New York and New Jersey, the buyer’s tax liability jumps from zero to 
$10,000 when the transaction price increases by one dollar from $999,999 to $1,000,000. 
The authors find that the tax distorts the price distribution and leads to significant bunching 
just below the threshold. The results also suggest that the impact of the tax is not limited to 
the proximity of the threshold, but extends much further, which indicates that the search and 
housing market matching process is affected by the tax notch.  
Slemrod et al. (2017) in turn study changes in transfer tax policy in Washington DC, which 
introduced a discontinuous jump in tax liability. In January 2003, the transfer tax rate was 
raised from 2.2% to 3.0%, but only for houses with a transaction price greater than or equal 
to $250,000. This created an incentive for the transaction price not to exceed $249,999. 
This discontinuity was later eliminated in October 2004, but a new tax notch was introduced 
in October 2006, increasing the tax rate from 2.2% to 2.9% on houses with a transaction 
price above $399,999. The authors conclude that, especially after the 2006 tax increase, 
transaction prices around the tax notch were negotiated downwards so as to lower the tax 
burden. In addition, they observe a small timing response around the implementation of the 
tax increase so as to avoid the anticipated implementation of the higher tax rate.  
In order to study the lock-in effects of the tax, the authors use transaction data from 1999 to 
2010 to construct a panel data set in which each house appears every month whether it sold 
or not and impute the price for months in which the house does not sell. For houses that 
were sold at least once during the time period under study, the question of interest is then 
how much lower is the likelihood that they are sold after the tax increase. The authors do 
not find significant effects on the likelihood of selling around the tax notch after the reform 
compared to houses in the control group. As a result, they conclude that the welfare costs 
related to housing transaction taxes are likely to be small. One potential reason for this dif-
ferent result relative to those mentioned above is that the tax change was relatively small. 
The authors also conjecture that there may be large differences in the relative bargaining 
power of the seller and buyer across different housing markets and within the same housing 
market area over the real estate cycle.  
Dachis et al. (2012) exploit the introduction of the Land Transfer Tax in the city of Toronto in 
early 2008. The authors estimate the effect of the tax by comparing the changes in the 
Greater Toronto housing market and the city of Toronto before and after the introduction of 
the tax. According to the results, the 1.1% tax caused a 15% decline in the number of sales 
and a decline in housing prices about equal to the tax. Assuming that the value of moving is 
uniformly distributed and using the value of an average house in Toronto, the authors eval-
uate the average value of a foregone transaction to be $6,559. Using the estimate on the 
reduction in transaction volume, the welfare loss is about $1 for every $8 in tax revenue.1 
Määttänen and Terviö (2017) examine the welfare effects of transaction taxes using a one-
sided assignment model with transaction costs and imperfectly transferable utility where 
households are heterogeneous by incomes, houses are heterogeneous by quality, and 
housing is a normal good. The framework represents a single labor market and therefore 
                                                     
1 Hilber and Lyytikäinen (2017) discuss why the deadweight loss is likely underestimated. 
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the focus is on the misallocation of houses caused by transaction costs. The model econo-
my is calibrated to represent the Helsinki metropolitan region. The authors assess the wel-
fare effects of a tax reform, where the transaction tax is replaced by a revenue-equivalent 
property tax. The aggregate welfare gain would be 13% of the tax revenue at the current 2% 
tax rate but increases rapidly with the tax rate. Interestingly, despite clear aggregate welfare 
gains many households are worse off. The reason is that, especially when the transaction 
tax is high, many households will anticipate that they will not move and hence do not face 
the tax. However, in a setting where the tax revenue is collected using a property tax, these 
households would necessarily face their share of the tax burden. Therefore, there may be 
political support for transaction taxes even at very high and distortionary rates if some 
households are more likely to trade than others and households have sufficient knowledge 
about their future need to move.  
The literature studying the effects of transfer taxes is also linked to studies on capital gains 
taxes and housing markets. The important common feature is that in both cases the tax 
payment is triggered by a transaction. The main difference is that for transfer taxes the tax 
base is the entire value of the house, while for capital gains taxes the tax base is the appre-
ciation in house value only. The empirical evidence on the effects of housing capital gains 
taxation is very limited. For the US, there are two studies exploiting the changes in the tax 
treatment of housing capital gains introduced by the Tax Relief Act of 1997. Shan (2011) 
and Cunningham and Engelhardt (2008) both conclude that the tax reduction raised the 
mobility rate among affected households. The estimated effects are relatively large, but at 
least Shan (2011) also finds that the short-term effect was much larger than the long-term 
effect.  
Finally, the level of transaction taxation may also influence house price volatility. It is possi-
ble that transaction taxes reduce house price volatility by reducing speculative trading. On 
the other hand, the presence of large transaction costs can also work in the opposite direc-
tion. High transaction costs may limit the use of arbitrage possibilities and thereby increase 
price volatility. However, there is apparently no empirical evidence on the relationship be-
tween the level of transfer taxation and house price volatility. 
All in all, most previous empirical studies find housing transfer taxes to have significant ef-
fects on housing transactions and household mobility. Welfare analyses point toward wel-
fare losses, which increase rapidly with the tax rate.  
3. INSTITUTIONAL SETTING AND REFORM 
The Finnish transfer tax applies to three different categories of ownership transfers: 1) real 
estate property including land and the residential structure (e.g. a lot with a detached house 
or other building or a piece of land with a summer house); 2) shares in co-ops and in real 
estate companies (e.g. an apartment in a residential building, an office, a housing unit in a 
row house or a parking space); and 3) other shares (corporate stocks, such as shares in a 
telephone company). Shares and other securities sold on the Stock Exchange are exempt 
from the tax. 
Co-ops are legal entities (typically limited-liability companies) that own residential buildings 
and in some cases also the lots of the buildings. In Finland, all multi-storey residential build-
ings and row houses are co-ops. In addition, the ownership of a single-family detached 
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house can also be organized as a co-op. In this case, the co-op usually includes several 
single-family houses.   
Owning shares in a co-op corresponding to a certain apartment in practice implies owning 
the apartment. For instance, the owner may renovate the apartment and the shares can be 
sold or the apartment rented out without the consent of the other shareholders. 
Housing co-ops often have outstanding loans obtained during the construction of the build-
ing or at some later stage for renovation. When buying shares for a particular apartment, the 
buyer becomes responsible for any co-op loans linked to the shares being bought.  
The transfer tax is paid by the buyer. First-time buyers under the age of 40 are exempt from 
paying the tax. The buyer officially becomes a shareholder of the co-op or the owner of the 
real estate only after the transfer tax has been paid.  
Until the end of February 2013, the tax rate for directly owned single-family houses was 4%, 
while the tax rate for shares in a co-op was 1.6%. The tax base for both housing types was 
the transaction price.  
In March 1, 2013 the transfer tax rate for co-ops was raised from 1.6% to 2% and the tax 
base was broadened to include housing co-op loans. For example, for a housing unit with a 
transaction price of 150,000 euros and an outstanding co-op loan of 15,000 euros, the 
transfer tax liability was 2400 euros (1.6%*150,000) before the reform. After the reform, the 
tax liability increased to 3300 euros (2%*165,000). The transfer tax treatment of directly 
owned single-family houses remained unchanged. 
The main aim of the reform was to increase tax revenue and to bring the tax treatment of 
co-ops and directly owned single-family houses closer together. According to the govern-
ment proposal, the size of co-op loans had been increasing before the reform, especially in 
newly built housing. This trend effectively narrowed the tax base. The situation was consid-
ered undesirable as the tax burden related to a given transaction depended on how the 
construction was financed. In the case of resales, the co-op loans were substantially lower.  
In 2012, total transfer tax revenue was roughly 580 million euros. According to the govern-
ment proposal, the reform was expected to increase annual tax revenue by roughly 80 mil-
lion euros. Slightly more than 50% of this increase was expected to result from the tax rate 
increase and the rest from the broadening of the tax base.  
The reform was initially announced in the beginning of October 2012 and was supposed to 
become effective on January 1, 2013. However, in December 5, 2012 it was announced that 
the reform would be postponed to March 1, 2013. The delay was due to technical issues in 
the tax administration. 
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4. DESCRIPTIVE EVIDENCE OF HOUSING 
TRANSACTIONS 
4.1 Transaction data  
Our first data set comes from tax registers and was obtained from Statistics Finland. The 
data are at the transaction level and contain information on units in co-ops and single-family 
houses. The data include the transaction price, (the price of shares in a co-op or the price of 
a single-family house), the amount of co-op loans, the amount of transfer taxes paid, the 
location and size of the housing unit, and whether the buyer is a first-time homebuyer.  
In principle, the data cover all transactions but with several shortcomings. First, a unit often 
has several owners. The data therefore contain transactions where one owner sells his or 
her share of the unit to the other owner(s). These “partial” transactions cannot be identified 
in the data. As a result, the prices obtained from these data may not be reliable. Second, for 
single-family houses the data only contain those transactions where the houses are located 
on an owned lot, i.e. the same person or persons own the house and the lot. All single-
family house transactions where the house is located on a lot rented, for example, from the 
municipality are missing from the data. Municipalities have adopted fairly diverse policies on 
how much land they own. Therefore the data cover transactions in different regions to a 
varying degree. Third, except for the floor area of the unit, the data do not contain infor-
mation about the characteristics of the unit or any identifier that would allow the data to be 
merged with other data sets containing information about the building or the housing units. 
This means, among other things, that the transactions cannot be divided into new construc-
tion and resales. 
Because of these shortcomings, in this section we mostly rely on transaction data collected 
by the Central Federation of Finnish Real Estate Agencies (KVKL). As not all real estate 
agencies are members of the federation and some transactions do not involve an agent, the 
data set represents a sample of the total volume of transactions. The upshot of these data is 
that they contain extensive information about the unit (housing type, floor area, number of 
rooms, the storey, sauna, balcony etc.) and the building (including the location of the build-
ing). However, the data contain no information about the buyer or the seller.  
4.2 Results 
Figure 1 shows the monthly transaction volume of housing units in co-ops and single-family 
houses from January 2006 to December 2016 using tax register data from Statistics Fin-
land. The figure shows substantial seasonal variation in transaction volumes. The uncertain-
ty created by the financial crisis toward the end of 2008 is also clearly visible in the figure. 
There seems to be a downward trend in transaction volumes before the financial crisis, but 
no visible trend after the crisis. 
With respect to co-ops, three observations can be made regarding the time around the tax 
reform. First, there is a clear spike before the reform, indicating substantial anticipation of 
the reform. Transaction volumes were roughly 50% higher in February 2013 than in Febru-
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ary 2012. The monthly transaction volume in co-ops in October and November was roughly 
30 and 20% higher, respectively, than in the corresponding months in 2011. Second, the 
monthly transaction volume in March 2013 was substantially lower than the typical transac-
tion volume in March (before or after the reform). Third, the monthly transaction volume in 
general seems to be lower after the tax reform. The average monthly transaction volume is 
16% lower in the three years following the reform than in the three years before the reform.   
For directly owned single-family houses, there is much less action in the transaction volume 
around the reform (but also during the financial crisis). In particular, the figure does not re-
veal clear anticipation effects. This is as expected because bringing a transaction forward to 
take place before the reform offers no financial gains for directly owned single-family hous-
es. However, the average monthly transaction volume is about 5% lower in the three years 
following the reform than in the three years before the reform. Therefore, it seems plausible 
that the reform lowered the transaction volume of housing units in co-ops, but may also 
have reduced the transaction volume of single-family houses.  
Figure 1. Total number of transactions. 
 
Notes: Co-ops include transactions of units in multi-storey buildings and row houses. The vertical red 
line shows the timing of the reform. Data: Statistics Finland. 
Figures 2–6 make use of transaction data from the Central Federation of Finnish Real Es-
tate Agencies. All the figures display monthly averages of the variable of interest from Janu-
ary 2006 to December 2016.  
These data allow us to divide transactions into housing units in multi-storey buildings, row 
houses and single-family houses. In addition, the data allow us to differentiate between new 
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construction and resales. This may be important as the time on the market and other market 
dynamics may be different for new construction and resales.  
Figure 2 first shows the share of new construction of the total transaction volume for differ-
ent housing types. In all cases, most transactions are always resales. This is particularly 
evident for single-family houses, for which the share of new construction is around 5% of all 
transactions. However, it also seems that the share of new construction increases before 
the reform for both co-op types subject to the reform. 
  
Figure 2. Share of new units out of all transactions by housing type. 
 
Notes: Multi-storey buildings and row houses are co-ops. The vertical red line shows the timing of the 
reform. Data: KVKL. 
Figure 3 shows the transaction volume for resales (left) and for new construction (right). 
Although the transaction volume for units in co-ops seems lower after the reform for both 
resales and new construction, the anticipation effect seems especially pronounced for new 
construction. This is consistent with Figure 2. All in all, the conclusion from Figure 3 is quite 
similar to that from Figure 1. This means that the KVKL data are representative enough to 
reflect the overall developments in the housing market around the time of the reform.  
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Figure 3. Number of transactions by housing type. 
 
Notes: Left panel: resales. Right panel: new construction. Multi-storey buildings and row houses are 
co-ops. The vertical red line shows the timing of the reform. Data: KVKL. 
Figure 4 shows the price development by housing type, again separately for resales (left) 
and new construction (right). The left panel shows divergence in the price developments 
starting roughly at the end of 2009 or early 2010. The average price per square meter of 
housing units in multi-storey co-ops was increasing and the price of single-family houses 
was decreasing, while the prices of units in row houses remained quite stable.  
Because the price developments diverged before the reform, evaluating the price effects of 
the reform using a differences-in-differences strategy (with co-ops as a treatment group and 
single-family houses as a control) may not be warranted. Furthermore, even under full capi-
talization, the prize effect would be very difficult to detect from normal price variation. There-
fore we do not analyze the price effects of the reform any further. 
Figure 4. Average prices (€/m2) by housing type. 
 
Notes: Left panel: resales. Right panel: new construction. Multi-storey buildings and row houses are 
co-ops. The vertical red line shows the timing of the reform. Data: KVKL. 
Next, we focus on the use of co-op loans in multi-storey buildings and row houses. Directly 
owned single-family houses are not in the figure as in these cases all housing related loans 
must be the owners’ personal loans. 
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There are various reasons for holding a co-op loan. For example, a co-op loan may be lu-
crative if access to mortgages is restricted or if mortgage interest rates are high relative to 
co-op loan interest rates.2 Before the reform, households also had incentives to hold co-op 
loans because they were not included in the transfer tax base. By broadening the tax base 
to include co-op loans, the tax reform eliminated this incentive. 
Therefore, one would expect co-op loans to constitute a smaller share of the transaction 
price after the reform. In addition, as housing units with a large housing co-op loan attached 
to them were subject to higher tax increases, one would expect those units to be overrepre-
sented in the transaction data just before the reform. This is because there was an incentive 
to bring the sale forward in order to avoid the tax increase. 
Figure 5 shows the co-op loan-to-value ratios for resales (left) and for new construction 
(right), where value refers to the sum of the transaction price and the co-op loan. The co-op 
loan-to-value ratios are much lower for resales than for new construction. Also, a clear up-
ward trend is visible in resales before the reform. For resales in particular, it seems that 
housing units with relatively large co-op loans were more likely to have been sold just before 
the reform, indicating anticipation. 
For new construction, the co-op loan-to-value ratio seems rather stable before the reform in 
multi-storey buildings, with 40–50% average shares between 2006 and early 2013. In row 
houses the average loan shares were clearly increasing before the reform. Based on Figure 
5, it is not possible to isolate the effect of the reform. However, it seems that reasons unre-
lated to the transfer tax are important for the use of co-op loans. One possible reason is the 
gradual phasing-out of mortgage interest deductibility starting in 2012. In 2016, 55% of 
mortgage interest was tax-deductible. 
Figure 5. Housing co-operative loan-to-value ratio by housing type. 
 
Notes: Left panel: resales. Right panel: new construction. The vertical red line shows the timing of the 
reform. Data: KVKL. 
Finally, Figure 6 shows the average time on the market calculated for each transaction as 
the difference between the listing date and the sale date. On average, sale times seem to 
be substantially longer for new construction than for resales. In addition, there seems to be 
more variation between months for new construction. In both panels, selling times are long-
er around the financial crisis. However, any potential effect of the reform on selling times is 
not clearly visible in the figures.  
                                                     
2 In Finland house loans are not assumable mortgages but personal loans. However, most Finnish house loans are secured by a home.  
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Figure 6. Time on the market (days) by housing type. 
 
Notes: Left panel: resales Right panel: new construction. The vertical red line shows the timing of the 
reform. Data: KVKL. 
5. EFFECTS ON MOBILITY 
5.1 Household data 
Our data on mobility come from Statistics Finland and include the entire population from 
2005 to 2015. The data contain extensive information about households, including house-
holds’ residence at the end of each year and whether the household is a renter or a home-
owner. The data also include information on the type of the unit, i.e. whether the unit is a 
directly owned single-family house or a co-op (single-family house, housing unit in a row 
house or in a multi-storey building). 
Our measure of moving is based on the location and the characteristics of the housing unit. 
Under our definition, a household moved if any of the following changed between the end of 
year t and t–1: (i) home municipality, (ii) type of housing unit or (iii) number of rooms. This 
definition means that we are going to miss some short-distance moves within the municipali-
ty, where the number of rooms and the type of unit did not change.  
Table 1 reports summary statistics for the homeowner households in our data. The first two 
columns include homeowners in directly owned single-family houses, which are our control 
group. The next six columns include three alternative treatment groups, which are used 
throughout the empirical analysis. The first group includes all homeowners living in co-ops. 
In columns (5) and (6), the treatment group is further narrowed down to those living in row 
or single-family houses, and finally in columns (7) and (8) to those living in single-family 
houses.  
The households in all co-op types are somewhat different from households living in directly 
owned single-family houses. For example, they are more mobile and more likely to be sin-
gle, and they live in more urban areas. However, homeowners living either in row or single-
family houses in co-ops are more similar to the control group in many respects. As these 
groups are more similar to the control group, the treatment effect estimates may be more 
reliable, but at the same time they may not generalize to the population of co-op homeown-
ers.  
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Table 1. Summary statistics for households. 
 
Directly owned 
single-family 
house 
Co-op, all house 
types 
Co-op, row 
house or single- 
family house 
Co-op, single-
family house 
 Mean Std. Dev. Mean
Std. 
Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Move (t, t–1) (0/1) 0.038 0.191 0.067 0.251 0.073 0.261 0.065 0.246 
Male hh head (0/1) 0.857 0.350 0.641 0.480 0.743 0.437 0.844 0.363 
Taxable income (€/year) 30963 20856 32524 21418 36843 23473 45986 28385 
Age 55.0 15.4 55.2 17.7 52.0 16.4 50.2 14.2 
Single (0/1) 0.226 0.419 0.474 0.499 0.320 0.466 0.183 0.387 
Number of children 0.823 1.135 0.363 0.750 0.590 0.912 0.891 1.057 
Upper secondary  
education (0/1) 0.194 0.395 0.351 0.477 0.367 0.482 0.477 0.499 
Employed (0/1) 0.580 0.494 0.546 0.498 0.645 0.479 0.735 0.442 
Unemployed (0/1) 0.056 0.230 0.047 0.211 0.045 0.208 0.039 0.192 
Student (0/1) 0.007 0.082 0.011 0.105 0.008 0.091 0.008 0.089 
Pensioner (0/1) 0.349 0.477 0.388 0.487 0.295 0.456 0.212 0.409 
Other (0/1) 0.009 0.092 0.007 0.085 0.006 0.078 0.007 0.084 
Urban municipality 0.462 0.499 0.845 0.362 0.741 0.438 0.845 0.362 
Semi-urban municipality 0.244 0.430 0.099 0.298 0.149 0.356 0.094 0.292 
Rural municipality 0.294 0.455 0.056 0.230 0.110 0.313 0.061 0.239 
N (all years) 8,874,187 7,307,203 2,813,476 683,120 
N (2012) 904,277 747,769 282,499 72,150 
Notes: Taxable income, age, education level and labor market status refer to the head of the house-
hold. 
 
In Table 2, we analyze the linkages with respect to moving between the homeowner groups 
in Table 1. The table shows the probability of moving for households in different types of 
housing units and the destination of the move. Conditional on moving, those owning a hous-
ing unit in a co-op are most likely to buy into another co-op (2.9%), but moves to directly 
owned single-family houses happen as well. Similarly, renters are most likely to move to 
another rental unit. In the case of owners living in a directly owned single-family house the 
differences with respect to move destination are smaller.  
Table 2. Mobility by origin and destination housing type. 
 No move Move to 
  
Directly 
owned sin-
gle-family 
house 
Co-op Renting 
Directly owned single-family house 0.962 0.013 0.010 0.016 
Co-op, all house types 0.932 0.017 0.029 0.021 
Co-op, row house or single family house 0.927 0.025 0.027 0.021 
Co-op, single family house 0.935 0.019 0.026 0.020 
Renting 0.808 0.028 0.034 0.130 
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5.2 Research design 
The transfer tax increases moving costs. But whose moving costs are affected, depends on 
the extent to which the transfer tax capitalizes into prices. Under full capitalization, only 
sellers’ moving costs increase, whereas with no capitalization only buyers’ moving costs 
increase. If capitalization is somewhere in between these opposites, both buyers and sellers 
are affected by the tax increase.  
We work with the full capitalization assumption, which is supported by the results in Dachis 
et al. (2012) and Kopczuk and Munroe (2015). Under this assumption, homeowner house-
holds living in co-ops are affected by the tax increase, whereas homeowners in directly 
owned single-family houses are unaffected. With less than full capitalization, moving costs 
change for prospective buyers as well. As some of these prospective buyers are in the con-
trol group, this would make it more difficult to find mobility effects. 
Ideally, we would want to compare the mobility of households for whom the costs of moving 
increased due to the transfer tax increase to the mobility of these same households assum-
ing that the transfer tax was not raised. Obviously, we never observe both outcomes for the 
same households and we need to impute a credible counterfactual that serves as the base-
line when estimating the causal effect of the transfer tax increase.  
We construct this counterfactual using homeowners living in single-family houses as a con-
trol group. Having data for the treatment and control groups before and after the tax in-
crease facilitates the use of difference-in-differences (DID) methods. 
Our DID model takes the form 
(1) , 1 , 1 2 , 3 , 1 , , 1 , * - *  * - * ,i t i t i t i t i t i t i tmove co op after co op after X u             
where move is equal to one if the household moved between the end of year t–1 and t and 
zero otherwise. The dummy variable co-op indicates the treatment group, which consists of 
homeowners who at the end of year t–1 lived in a co-op. The control group consists of 
homeowners who lived in a directly owned single-family house at the end of year t–1. The 
dummy variable after indicates the time period after the tax increase. The vector X denotes 
the control variables, which include household characteristics and municipality fixed effects. 
The parameter for the interaction term, δ3, has a causal interpretation if two assumptions are 
met. The first is the common trends assumption, which means that in the absence of the 
treatment the mobility of homeowners living in co-ops and single-family houses would have 
developed similarly. This assumption can be tested indirectly by analyzing the pre-treatment 
trends in mobility in the treatment and control groups.  
The second assumption is that there are no spillovers across the treatment and control 
groups. That is, the mobility of households in the control group is not affected by the mobility 
decisions of the households in the treatment group. This assumption is likely to fail at least 
to some extent because the two housing market segments are connected through transac-
tion chains (see also Dachis et al. 2012). More specifically, if the tax increase also reduces 
mobility in the single-family houses not directly affected by the tax increase, our estimates 
will be biased towards zero. 
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Our household data are at an annual level and the place of residence is recorded at the last 
day of the year. The tax increase in turn was announced in October 2012 and eventually 
took place in March 2013. Hence, two additional issues regarding the timing of the treatment 
should be discussed.  
The first issue concerns those households who moved in January or February of 2013. 
These households moved before the tax increase, but in our baseline specification these 
moves are misclassified as having taken place in the post-reform period. This may lead to a 
downward bias in our estimates. This is true if the tax increase reduces mobility after March 
2013.   
The second issue concerns the possibility that households planning to move bring their 
transaction forward in order to benefit from the lower pre-reform tax. This might also mean 
that they move before the end of 2012. In our baseline specification, this anticipation re-
sponse would lead to a bias away from zero in our estimates when it comes to the longer-
term effects of the tax. However, the average sale time for co-ops is over 60 days (see Fig-
ure 6). This means that households putting their house on the market in early October 2012 
expect to sell the house sometime early December. Because there is no reason to bring the 
actual move forward once the transaction is completed before the tax increase, this may not 
be a serious concern in our setting. Nonetheless, in order to check the robustness of our 
results to these timing issues, we estimate specifications where we omit the year 2013 or 
both years 2012 and 2013.  
The possible presence of group-level year effects causes problems for statistical inference 
in this type of models. With only two groups, standard clustering methods produce incon-
sistent standard errors (Wooldridge 2003). In order to address this issue, we use the two-
step procedure proposed by Donald and Lang (2007), which effectively treats the number of 
group-years as the number of observations.  Instead of estimating equation (1) directly, we 
first use the household-level data to estimate yearly group-specific intercepts cg,t from the 
following model 
(2) , , , 1 , ,i t g t i t i tmove c X v     
where  - .,  -g co op single family  In the second step, we use the annual group-level data on 
,g tc  to estimate the DID model: 
(3)   , 1 g, 2 g, 3 g, , g, * - *  * - * .g t t t t t g t tc co op after co op after u         
The statistical inference is based on the degrees of freedom in this group-level regression.   
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5.3 Results 
Overall effects 
We start by presenting graphical evidence on the mobility rate of homeowners in the treat-
ment and control groups. This allows us not only to visually assess the plausibility of the 
common trends assumption, but also the size of the possible treatment effect. We consider 
three different treatment groups. The first group includes all homeowners living in co-ops 
(multi-storey, row house and single-family house). The second consists of homeowners 
living in row house or single-family house co-ops and the third group consists of homeown-
ers living in single-family house co-ops only.  
The left panel in Figure 7 presents the group-specific mobility rates and in the right panel the 
mobility rates are normalized to one in 2012 just before the tax increase. Three observations 
stand out from Figure 7. First, the mobility rate is clearly higher in all of the treatment groups 
throughout the time period (left panel). Second, the trends are similar in the treatment and 
control groups in the pre-treatment period. This is especially clear after normalization, when 
we compare proportionate changes in the mobility rate relative to 2012 (right panel). We 
present the results of the formal pre-treatment placebo tests in Tables A1–A3 in the Appen-
dix. Finally, after the tax increase, the mobility rate decreases in both groups, but clearly 
more so in the treatment group. This suggests that the transfer tax increase lowered the 
mobility of households in the treatment group. 
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Figure 7. Mobility rate for homeowners in co-ops (treatment) and in directly 
owned single-family houses (control). 
 
  
  
Notes: The left panel in the figure presents the group-specific mobility rates and in the right panel the 
mobility rates are normalized to one in 2012. Mobility rate refers to the share of homeowners in each 
group who move between the end of year t–1 and the end of year t. Group assignment is based on the 
homeowners’ housing type in year t–1. There are three treatment groups (blue lines). The first group 
includes all homeowners in co-ops, the second homeowners in row and single-family house co-ops 
and the third single-family house co-ops. The control group (red line) includes homeowners in directly 
owned single-family houses. 
 
Table 3 presents the DID regression results corresponding to Figure 7 using the two-step 
procedure of Donald and Lang (2007). In the first column, the first-stage regression does not 
include the household-level control variables. In the second column, we add the control 
variables to the first stage. In the third column, the specification is same as in column (2), 
0
.0
1
.0
2
.0
3
.0
4
.0
5
.0
6
.0
7
.0
8
.0
9
.1
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
All co-op Directly owned single-family
.6
.7
.8
.9
1
1.
1
1.
2
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
All co-op Directly owned single-family
0
.0
1
.0
2
.0
3
.0
4
.0
5
.0
6
.0
7
.0
8
.0
9
.1
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Row and single-family co-op Directly owned single-family
.6
.7
.8
.9
1
1.
1
1.
2
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Row and single-family co-op Directly owned single-family
0
.0
1
.0
2
.0
3
.0
4
.0
5
.0
6
.0
7
.0
8
.0
9
.1
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Single-family co-op Directly owned single-family
.6
.7
.8
.9
1
1.
1
1.
2
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Single-family co-op Directly owned single-family
 
 
 
 
18 
 
 
except that the dependent variable is the log of the mobility rate. All the model specifications 
include year dummies in the second step.   
The regression results are in line with Figure 7 and robust across specifications. Interesting-
ly, the effect is largest for the treatment group that includes both row and single-family 
houses (0.72 percentage points) and smallest for the treatment group that includes all co-op 
types (0.32 percentage points). Compared to the pre-treatment mobility rate, this implies 
that the mobility rate decreased by between 4.3% and 10% in different housing types. For 
all co-ops, this translates to roughly 2400 fewer moves per year (-0,0032*747,769). 
Furthermore, given that the reform increased the transfer tax rate in the treatment group on 
average by only 0.5 percentage points (this includes the rate increase and the broadening of 
the tax base), the order of magnitude of the effect is comparable to prior studies.   
Table 3. DID results for mobility. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dep. Var.  Mobility rate Mobility rate Ln(Mobility rate)
Panel A: All co‐op types 
Co‐op  0.0306***  0.0197***  0.370*** 
[0.000607]  [0.000682]  [0.00913] 
Co‐op*After  ‐0.00395*** ‐0.00318**  ‐0.0426** 
[0.00111]  [0.00125]  [0.0167] 
Pre‐treatment mean  0.0696  0.0696 
Panel B: Row houses and single family houses 
Co‐op  0.0378***  0.0240***  0.423*** 
[0.00105]  [0.00106]  [0.0133] 
Co‐op*After  ‐0.00805*** ‐0.00724*** ‐0.101*** 
[0.00192]  [0.00194]  [0.0242] 
Pre‐treatment mean  0.0767  0.0767 
Panel C: Only single family houses 
Co‐op  0.0286***  0.0196***  0.374*** 
[0.000877]  [0.000922]  [0.0125] 
Co‐op*After  ‐0.00606*** ‐0.00499**  ‐0.0736** 
[0.00160]  [0.00168]  [0.0228] 
Pre‐treatment mean  0.0675  0.0675 
Year dummies (2nd step)  X  X  X 
Controls (1st step)    X  X 
N  20  20  20 
Notes: Table shows DID estimates using the Donald and Lang (2007) two-step procedure. Standard 
errors are in brackets. Significance is denoted by asterisks * p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. The con-
trol variables include the household characteristics reported in Table 1 and municipality fixed effects 
(at t–1). 
In Table 4, we test the robustness of the results with respect to anticipation effects. As dis-
cussed above, moves that were planned to take place in 2013 may have taken place al-
ready in late 2012 because of the tax increase. As our measure of moving is based on the 
situation at the end of each year, this anticipation effect would show up in our data as ex-
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cessive moves in 2012 and fewer moves in 2013, respectively, leading to a bias away from 
zero in our DID estimates.  
To check whether this is the case, we first drop 2013 and then both 2012 and 2013 from the 
analysis. As the table shows, the results are robust to the exclusion of these years, indicat-
ing that anticipatory behavior is not a major concern in our analysis. The point estimates are 
very close to those reported in Table 3, but in some cases the statistical significance is 
weaker due to fewer degrees of freedom. 
Table 4. Robustness with respect to anticipation effects. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
  2013 dropped 
2012 and 
2013 dropped 2013 dropped 
2012 and 
2013 
dropped 
Dep. Var.  Mobility rate  Mobility rate 
Ln(Mobility 
rate) 
Ln(Mobility 
rate) 
Panel A: All co‐op types   
Co‐op*After  ‐0.00336*  ‐0.00322  ‐0.0465*  ‐0.0445* 
[0.00154]  [0.00167]  [0.0205]  [0.0221] 
Panel B: Row houses and single family houses   
Co‐op*After  ‐0.00758**  ‐0.00769**  ‐0.107***  ‐0.109**  
[0.00240]  [0.00263]  [0.0297]  [0.0325]    
Panel C: Only single family houses   
Co‐op*After  ‐0.00500**  ‐0.00496*  ‐0.0744**  ‐0.0739* 
[0.00209]  [0.00230]  [0.0283]  [0.0311] 
N  18  16  18  16 
Notes: Table shows DID estimates using the Donald and Lang (2007) two-step procedure. Standard 
errors are in brackets. Significance is denoted by asterisks * p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. All the 
models include household characteristics and municipality fixed effects in the first step, and the co-op 
main effect and year dummies in the second step.  
 
We report additional robustness checks in Tables A4–A6 using the three alternative treat-
ment groups. In the baseline specification, we use data for the entire time period 2005–
2015. One may argue that observations at the beginning of the period far from the tax re-
form may not provide as good a point of comparison for the post-reform years as observa-
tions closer to the reform. Therefore we vary the width of the time window around the reform 
from 2007–2015 to 2011–2015 (Panel A). In Panel B, we additionally drop year 2013 from 
the analysis. In Panel C, we allow for differential group-specific linear time trends. In Panel 
D, we both drop year 2013 and use group-specific trends.  
Overall, the results seem robust to these changes in the specification. The point estimates 
are always negative and vary only slightly around our baseline estimate. The estimates be-
come insignificant in some specifications with the narrower time windows, but this is mostly 
due to the fact that in these specifications we have very few remaining degrees of freedom. 
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Effects on mobility within and between labor markets 
We are also interested in whether the transfer tax hinders moves between or within labor 
markets or both. We do not have a clear definition of what constitutes a labor market so we 
use two different regional divisions. The first regional division that we use is the county divi-
sion (NUTS 3). There are 19 counties in Finland and they are quite large geographic areas. 
It is quite uncommon to live in one county and work in another. Thus, moves between coun-
ties are likely to be moves where the household’s labor market changes. With this definition 
labor market related within county moves will be misclassified.  
The second regional division that we use is the municipality division. In 2013, there were 
320 municipalities. Most people live and work in the same municipality, but commuting 
across municipal borders is much more common than across county borders. So here we 
are likely to misclassify some within labor market moves as between labor market moves.  
Table 5 presents the results for four types of moves. Columns (1) and (2) report results for 
between and within county moves, whereas columns (3) and (4) report between and within 
municipality moves.  According to the pre-treatment means reported in the table, moving 
between labor markets is clearly less common than moving within a labor market, regard-
less of the labor market definition.  
The transfer tax appears to hinder both between and within labor market moves. This find-
ing is in contrast with the findings of Hilber and Lyytikäinen (2017), who report that in the UK 
transfer taxes only hinder short-distance and housing-related moves.   
Table 5. Effects on between and within labor market moves. 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Type of move 
Between 
counties 
Within 
county 
Between 
municipalities
Within 
municipality 
Panel A: All co‐op types 
Co‐op*After  ‐0.000285*  ‐0.00289**  ‐0.00209***  ‐0.00086 
[0.000136]  [0.00118]  [0.000468]  [0.000869] 
Pre‐treatment mean  0.0100  0.0595  0.0267  0.0426 
Panel B: Row houses and single family houses 
Co‐op*After  ‐0.000907** ‐0.00633*** ‐0.00347***  ‐0.00346** 
[0.000309]  [0.00171]  [0.000903]  [0.00115] 
Pre‐treatment mean  0.00985  0.0668  0.0283  0.0477 
Panel C: Only single family houses 
Co‐op*After  ‐0.000975** ‐0.00402**  ‐0.00294***  ‐0.00188 
[0.000396]  [0.00142]  [0.000715]  [0.00115] 
Pre‐treatment mean  0.00829  0.0592  0.0259  0.0413 
N  20  20  20  20 
Notes: Table shows DID estimates using the Donald and Lang (2007) two-step procedure. Standard 
errors are in brackets. Significance is denoted by asterisks * p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. All the 
models include household characteristics and municipality fixed effects in the first step, and the co-op 
main effect and year dummies in the second step. 
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6. WELFARE EFFECTS 
In this section, we evaluate the welfare costs of the transfer tax increase related to the mo-
bility results presented in the previous section. When the transfer tax is raised, some moves 
that would have taken place in the absence of the increase will not take place. The welfare 
cost of the tax increase is the overall utility loss related to these foregone moves.  
The size of the welfare cost can be illustrated by calculating the marginal cost of public 
funds (MCF), which relates the welfare loss of a tax increase to the additional tax revenue 
raised. For a non-distortionary tax, one tax-euro collected from the private sector is worth 
exactly one euro for the private sector and the MCF is equal to one. The larger the welfare 
cost related to the tax, the larger the MCF. 
The MCF can be approximated by 
           
   
 
0 1 1 0
1 0
,
W t W t R t R t W t R t
MCF
R t R t R t
         
where ∆W refers to the welfare loss resulting from increasing the tax rate from t0 to t1 and ∆R 
is the additional tax revenue. 
The additional tax revenue raised can be expressed as 
    1 01 ,R t t p m t p m         
where p is the average price (transaction price including any co-op loan) and m is the num-
ber of moves prior to the tax increase.3 The parameter γ is the percentage change in mobili-
ty when the tax rate is raised from t0 to t1. The value of γ is based on our mobility estimates. 
Taking all co-op types together, the tax increase decreased the mobility rate by 4.3%. 
Therefore, in what follows  = 0.043. 
In our transaction data, the average co-op loan-to-value-ratio after 2013 for resales was 
roughly 5%. This means that the average effective tax rate on the transaction price including 
any co-op loan was 1.52% before the reform and 2% after the reform. Hence, in our MCF 
calculations we set t0 = 0.0152 and t1 = 0.02. 
We cannot directly observe the welfare loss related to the foregone moves. However, we 
can conjecture that before the tax increase, trades involving housing units in co-ops with a 
welfare gain smaller than 1.52% of the price (i.e. transaction price including any co-op loan) 
did not take place. In the same way, we know that the welfare loss related to the foregone 
moves cannot exceed 2% of the price after the tax increase. Therefore the welfare loss re-
lated to a foregone move is somewhere between 1.52% and 2% of the price. Thus, the 
overall welfare loss lies within the interval  
    0 1,  .W t m t p m t p       
                                                     
3 Note that this expression assumes that the tax increase does not affect the transaction price. Furthermore, we can observe the total transfer tax revenue 
before and after the tax increase, but we do not know how much of the tax revenue is collected from moves and how much from other transactions (e.g. 
landlords trading) so we base our calculations of the MCF on our mobility estimates.  
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Plugging the tax rates and the estimated effect on the mobility rate into the above formulas 
gives a range of MCF values of  
   1.17,1.22 .MCF   
Considering that the property tax, when levied on land value, is non-distortionary, eliminat-
ing the existing transfer tax in favor of a revenue-equivalent increase in the property tax on 
land value would increase aggregate welfare (see also Dachis et al. 2012). However, as 
only a small fraction of households move annually, the tax burden of these two tax forms is 
quite differently distributed (see also Määttänen and Terviö 2017). 
Finally, it is interesting to see how our estimate of the MCF relates to comparable estimates 
obtained in prior literature. Dachis et al. (2012) report that the imposition of a 1.1% tax in the 
city of Toronto caused a welfare loss of $1 for every $8 in tax revenue, which implies a wel-
fare loss of 13% relative to the tax revenue raised. Besley et al. (2014) use the UK stamp 
duty holiday which temporarily abolished the 1% tax rate and find the welfare loss to be 
between 2% and 15%. Hilber and Lyytikäinen (2017) exploit a discontinuity in the UK stamp 
duty schedule where the tax rate jumps from 1% to 3% and find the welfare cost to be 84% 
relative to the additional tax revenue raised.  
On the other hand, Slemrod et al. (2017), when considering a tax rate increase from 2.2% to 
2.9% for housing units with a transaction price at least $400,000 in Washington DC, con-
clude that the welfare loss from this increase was small. Kopczuck and Munroe (2015) and 
Best and Kleven (2018) also find sizable welfare losses, but they do not report numbers that 
would allow us to assess the MCF in their settings.  
Taken together, this set of results from different institutional settings suggests that the wel-
fare loss is relatively modest at low transfer tax rates, but increases quite rapidly with the tax 
rate. This conclusion is also drawn by Määttänen and Terviö (2017), who evaluate how the 
MCF depends on the transfer tax rate using a model economy calibrated to represent the 
Helsinki Metropolitan Area.  
7. CONCLUSIONS 
We study the effect of the Finnish transfer tax on housing market activity and household 
mobility using Finnish micro data. In March 2013, the transfer tax rate was raised and the 
tax base broadened for co-ops (shares in housing co-operatives), but the tax treatment of 
directly owned single-family houses remained unchanged. This reform enables the use of 
the differences-in-differences design.  
Our descriptive analysis suggests that the tax reform was anticipated in the housing market 
and induced timing responses, whereby transactions that would have taken place after the 
reform were brought forward to late 2012 and early 2013 so as to avoid the tax increase. 
The anticipation effects were especially pronounced for new construction and for resales 
with relatively large co-op loans.  
It also seems that the tax increase on co-ops had a negative effect on the transaction vol-
ume of housing units in co-ops over the long-run, and may have influenced transactions of 
single-family houses. Finally, although the reform eliminated the transfer tax-related incen-
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tive to hold large co-op loans, the possible effects of this change were not large enough to 
lower average co-op loans after the reform. Instead, co-op loans have continued to increase 
after the reform both in new construction and resales. 
In general, our results on transaction volume are consistent with most previous results using 
similar research designs (Dachis et al. 2012; Besley et al. 2014; Kopczuk and Munroe, 2015 
and Best and Kleven, 2018), but in contrast with Slemrod et al. (2017), who do not find a 
transfer tax increase to have negative effects on transaction volumes in the long-run. 
Our results, based on household data comprising the entire population of Finland for 2005–
2015, suggest that the transfer tax has a significant negative impact on household mobility. 
Interestingly, the tax increase had a negative effect on both within and between labor mar-
ket moves. The latter result is in contrast with previous findings in the literature which sug-
gest that transfer taxes only hinder short-distance and housing-related moves. Our results 
imply that housing transfer taxes may lead to a mismatch not only of households and hous-
es, but also to a mismatch between workers and jobs.  
Our analysis of household mobility assumes that the mobility rates of households living in 
and owning single-family houses are not affected by the reform and hence they constitute a 
reliable control group for the analysis. This assumption is quite standard in the literature. 
However, it is also important to note that possible spillovers from the market for co-ops to 
the market for single-family houses cannot be ruled out. These spillovers may bias our re-
sults toward zero. 
 
  
 
24 
 
LITERATURE 
Besley, T. – Meads, N. – Surico, P. (2014): The incidence of transaction taxes: Evidence from a stamp 
duty holiday. Journal of Public Economics 119, 61–70. 
Best, M. – Kleven, H. (2018): Housing Market Responses to Transaction Taxes: Evidence from 
Notches and Stimulus in the UK. Review of Economic Studies 85 (1), 157–193. 
Cunningham, C.R. – Engelhardt, G.V. (2008): Housing capital-gains taxation and home-owner mobili-
ty: evidence from the taxpayer relief act of 1997. Journal of Urban Economics 63(3), 803–815. 
Dachis, B. – Duranton, G. – Turner, M.A. (2012): The effects of land transfer taxes on real estate mar-
kets: evidence from a natural experiment in Toronto. Journal of Economic Geography 12(2), 327–354. 
Donald, S.G. – Lang, K. (2007): Inference with Difference-In-Differences and Other Panel Data. Re-
view of Economics Statistics 89(2), 221–233. 
Hilber, C. A. – Lyytikäinen, T. (2017): Transfer taxes and household mobility: distortion on the housing 
or labor market? Journal of Urban Economics 101, 57–73. 
Kopczuk, W. – Munroe, D. (2015): Mansion Tax: The Effect of Transfer Taxes on the Residential Real 
Estate Market. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 7(2), 214–57.  
Mirrlees, J. – Adam, S. – Besley, T. – Bell, R. – Bond, S. – Chote, R. – Gammie, M. – Johnson, P. – 
Myles, G. – Poterba, J. M., (2011): Tax by design. Oxford University Press. 
Määttänen, N. – Terviö, M. (2017): Welfare Effects of Housing Transaction Taxes. CEPR Discussion 
Papers 12551.  
Shan, H.  (2011): The effect of capital gains taxation on home sales: evidence from the taxpayer relief 
act of 1997. Journal Public Economics 95(102), 177–188. 
Slemrod, J. – Weber, C. – Shan, H. (2017): The behavioral response to housing transfer taxes: Evi-
dence from a notched change in DC policy. Journal of Urban Economics 100, 137–153.  
Wooldridge, J.M. (2003): Cluster-Sample Methods in Applied Econometrics. American Economic Re-
view 93, 133–138. 
 
  
  
 
25 
 
APPENDIX: VALIDITY AND ROBUSTNESS 
CHECKS 
Table A1. Placebo tests – all co-ops in treatment group. 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Placebo reform  2006  2007  2008  2009 
Co‐op*AfterPlacebo  ‐0.00145  ‐0.00255* ‐0.00016 0.00103 
[0.00201]  [0.00130] [0.00147] [0.00142]
Placebo reform  2010  2011  2012  2014 
Co‐op*AfterPlacebo  0.00119  0.00103  ‐0.00055 0.00106 
[0.00155]  [0.00205] [0.00235] [0.00233]
N  20  20  20  20 
Notes: Table shows placebo DID estimates using the Donald and Lang (2007) two-step procedure. All 
the models include the true treatment variable and the placebo treatment in the year shown. Standard 
errors are in brackets. Significance is denoted by asterisks * p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. All the 
models include household characteristics and municipality fixed effects in the first step, and the co-op 
main effect and year dummies in the second step. 
 
 
 
Table A2. Placebo tests – co-op row houses and single-family houses in 
treatment group. 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Placebo reform  2006  2007  2008  2009 
Co‐op*AfterPlacebo  ‐0.00379  ‐0.00514** ‐0.00221  0.000284
[0.00292]  [0.00160]  [0.00214] [0.00230]
Placebo reform  2010  2011  2012  2014 
Co‐op*AfterPlacebo  0.000332  ‐0.000759  ‐0.00102  0.00124 
[0.00252]  [0.00324]  [0.00367] [0.00366]  
N  20  20  20  20 
Notes: Table shows placebo DID estimates using the Donald and Lang (2007) two-step procedure. . 
All the models include the true treatment variable and the placebo treatment in the year shown. 
Standard errors are in brackets. Significance is denoted by asterisks * p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. 
All the models include household characteristics and municipality fixed effects in the first step, and the 
co-op main effect and year dummies in the second step. 
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Table A3. Placebo tests – only co-op single-family houses in treatment group. 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Placebo reform  2006  2007  2008  2009 
Co‐op*AfterPlacebo  ‐0.000532  ‐0.00146  0.000521 0.00304 
[0.00281]  [0.00211] [0.00198] [0.00163]
Placebo reform  2010  2011  2012  2014 
Co‐op*AfterPlacebo  0.00172  0.000321 0.000000 0.00228 
[0.00208]  [0.00281] [0.00319] [0.00307]  
N  20  20  20  20 
Notes: Table shows placebo DID estimates using the Donald and Lang (2007) two-step procedure. All 
the models include the true treatment variable and the placebo treatment in the year shown. Standard 
errors are in brackets. Significance is denoted by asterisks * p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. All the 
models include household characteristics and municipality fixed effects in the first step, and the co-op 
main effect and year dummies in the second step. 
 
 
Table A4. Robustness to time window and inclusion of group-specific time 
trends – all co-ops in treatment group. 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Time window  2007‐2015  2008‐2015  2009‐2015 2010‐2015  2011‐2015 
Panel A: Varying time window 
DID estimate  ‐0.00297*  ‐0.00245*  ‐0.00311** ‐0.00377***  ‐0.00403** 
   [0.00132]  [0.00120]  [0.000927] [0.000606]  [0.000704] 
Panel B: Varying time window and 2013 dropped 
DID estimate  ‐0.00316  ‐0.00263  ‐0.00330** ‐0.00395**  ‐0.00422** 
   [0.00164]  [0.00149]  [0.00116]  [0.000745]  [0.000889] 
Panel C: Varying time window and group‐specific trends 
DID estimate  ‐0.00387  ‐0.00635*** ‐0.00566** ‐0.00464**  ‐0.0044 
   [0.00246]  [0.00132]  [0.00146]  [0.00135]  [0.00170] 
Panel D: Varying time window, and group‐specific trends and 2013 dropped 
DID estimate  ‐0.00439  ‐0.00789*** ‐0.00740** ‐0.00634*  ‐0.00697 
   [0.00307]  [0.00103]  [0.00129]  [0.00154]  [0.00272] 
N   18  16  14  12  10 
N (2013 dropped)  16  14  12  10  8 
Pre‐treatment mean  0.0635  0.0626 0.0632 0.0649  0.0655 
Notes: Table shows DID estimates using the Donald and Lang (2007) two-step procedure. Standard 
errors are in brackets. Significance is denoted by asterisks * p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. All the 
models include household characteristics and municipality fixed effects in the first step, and the co-op 
main effect and year dummies in the second step. 
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Table A5. Robustness to time window and inclusion of group-specific time 
trends – co-op row houses and single-family houses in treatment group. 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Time window  2007‐2015  2008‐2015  2009‐2015  2010‐2015  2011‐2015 
Panel A: Varying time window 
DID estimate  ‐0.00670*** ‐0.00577*** ‐0.00630*** ‐0.00740***  ‐0.00748***
   [0.00191]  [0.00150]  [0.00152]  [0.000914]  [0.00118] 
Panel B: Varying time window and 2013 dropped 
DID estimate  ‐0.00704**  ‐0.00611**  ‐0.00663**  ‐0.00774***  ‐0.00782** 
   [0.00237]  [0.00185]  [0.00189]  [0.00110]  [0.00146] 
Panel C: Varying time window and group‐specific trends 
DID estimate  ‐0.00611  ‐0.00956*** ‐0.00936**  ‐0.00702**  ‐0.00674 
   [0.00361]  [0.00232]  [0.00289]  [0.00219]  [0.00282] 
Panel D: Varying time window, and group‐specific trends and 2013 dropped 
DID estimate  ‐0.00661  ‐0.0114**  ‐0.0118**  ‐0.00844  ‐0.00865 
   [0.00455]  [0.00255]  [0.00345]  [0.00348]  [0.00649] 
N   18  16  14  12  10 
N (2013 dropped)  16  14  12  10  8 
Pre‐treatment 
mean  0.0689  0.0676  0.0681  0.0702  0.0706 
Notes: Table shows DID estimates using the Donald and Lang (2007) two-step procedure. Standard 
errors are in brackets. Significance is denoted by asterisks * p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. All the 
models include household characteristics and municipality fixed effects in the first step, and the co-op 
main effect and year dummies in the second step. 
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Table A6. Robustness to time window and inclusion of group-specific time 
trends – only co-op single-family houses in treatment group. 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Time window  2007‐2015  2008‐2015 2009‐2015 2010‐2015  2011‐2015 
Panel A: Varying time window 
DID estimate  ‐0.00492** ‐0.00458*  ‐0.00522* ‐0.00673***  ‐0.00622** 
   [0.00184]  [0.00197]  [0.00204]  [0.00116]  [0.00135] 
Panel B: Varying time windows and 2013 dropped 
DID estimate  ‐0.00493*  ‐0.00459  ‐0.00523  ‐0.00674**  ‐0.00623* 
   [0.00229]  [0.00248]  [0.00258]  [0.00150]  [0.00181] 
Panel C: Varying time windows and group‐specific trends 
DID estimate  ‐0.00709*  ‐0.00941** ‐0.00927* ‐0.00599  ‐0.00677 
   [0.00331]  [0.00313]  [0.00391]  [0.00276]  [0.00327] 
Panel D: Varying time windows, and group‐specific trends and 2013 dropped 
DID estimate  ‐0.00755  ‐0.0108*  ‐0.0111  ‐0.00541  ‐0.00798 
   [0.00417]  [0.00394]  [0.00536]  [0.00471]  [0.00787] 
N   18  16  14  12  10 
N (2013 dropped)  16  14  12  10  8 
Pre‐treatment mean  0.0625  0.0619  0.0624  0.0649  0.0648 
Notes: Table shows DID estimates using the Donald and Lang (2007) two-step procedure. Standard 
errors are in brackets. Significance is denoted by asterisks * p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. All the 
models include household characteristics and municipality fixed effects in the first step, and the co-op 
main effect and year dummies in the second step. 
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